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T he E uropean Policy U n it
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created 
to further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the 
European University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items 
on the Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available 
to scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research 
projects on topics of current interest to the European Communities. Both 
as in-depth background studies and as policy analyses in their own right, 





















































































































































































From Individual Privacy to the Privacy of Groups 
and Nations — An Approach to the Problems of 
the Structure of the European Public Sphere
Mihaly Szivos*
The researcher dealing with the scientific analysis of the political and 
legal provisions of the public sphere (Offentlichkeit), as opposed to 
provisions for the protection of privacy, may note a curious phenome­
non which has emerged primarily with regard to the Western European 
and American situations. The American monographic literature is 
generally richer in works centred on the rights of the individual to 
privacy; whereas in Europe, it is the history and structure of the public 
sphere1 that have been studied more successfully. In the latter case, 
Habermas’ research into the theory and history of this sphere and its 
wide-ranging impact in sociology could be mentioned.
Starting in the 1960s, a slow process of convergence or equalization 
of these tendencies began. This was signalled, in Western Europe, by 
the activity of inquirers such as Michel Foucault — especially by the last 
phase of his work, in which he was concerned with the description of 
the emergence of the individual, the self and its technologies of 
self-defence and self-construction.2 This trend also manifests itself in 
the fact that, both in the U.S. and in Europe, steps have been taken 
towards the autonomy of social groups and, more specifically, towards
Dr. Mihaly Szivos, researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences in Budapest, was a guest at the European Policy Unit in the 
framework of the Phare Programme during the Spring of 1991.
1 In the literature, the categories “public domain”, “general public” and “public at 
large” have also been used.
2 It is sufficient to refer here to his project called “Technologies of the Self’, of 
which his work “History of Sexuality” forms part. In: Technologies of the Self. A 





























































































ensuring their right to a private sphere. Owing to the historically 
moulded disparities in the structure of the public sphere, the paths 
leading to the direct or indirect recognition of the privacy of the group 
have been different in Europe from those on the other side of the 
Atlantic.
The European public sphere and its various aspects have been major 
factors in the intellectual preparation for, and development of, 
European integration. History suggests that all the major social unions 
based upon voluntary association have been preceded by the emergence 
of some kind of public access. The potentialities implicit in the 
development of a European public sphere did not, however, become 
manifest until Europe lost its hegemonic role in world politics due to 
the political changes following World War II. The recognition of new 
political interests and of the interdependence of European nations 
made visible those processes which had developed in the force field of 
the major history-shaping factors and which had previously operated in 
a subordinated and quite distorted fashion. In this paper we intend — in 
the context o f the structure o f the European public sphere — to give a 
schematic description o f the processes leading to the indirect or direct 
recognition of the private sphere o f groups, macrogroups and/or nations. We 
also provide a historical definition o f privacy. As for historical and 
political processes and trends in the history of ideas, we shall discuss 
those which are relevant to the development of the public and private 
spheres.
In terms of both actual social development and theoretical analysis, 
the emergence of individual privacy preceded the emergence of group 
privacy. Methodologically, that fact alone is sufficient justification for us 
to start our discussion with individual privacy.
In the U.S., an impressive body of literature on the topic of privacy 
has been produced and, in terms of legislation relating to the private 
spheres of individuals and groups, this country is top of the league table. 
That has warranted including in our analysis those facts of U.S. history 
which seem to explain the traditionally stronger American demand for 
privacy. The methodology of this paper is characterized, moreover, by 
the combination of the different aspects of the complex of questions 
relating to privacy — aspects hitherto treated separately — placing them 
in a historical context.
The wide-ranging controversies over the question of privacy, the 
considerable contraries over the interpretation of the concept, the lack 
of professional consensus, and the divergent approaches of the 
academic disciplines relevant to the subject of privacy, all impel us to 




























































































The concept of privacy —  a historical approach
The majority of the works focussing on privacy tend to be dominated by 
a juristic approach. The first truly ambitious, interdisciplinary works 
which scrutinize the development of privacy from its ancient forms did 
not emerge until the late 1960s.3 Analysis of this kind is particularly 
important if only because, in the case of the public sphere and 
especially public opinion, the pragmatic criteria of practical research 
(the study of electoral behaviour, consumer behaviour, etc.) have 
distracted researchers’ attention away from the historical dimension. As 
a result, these researchers have arrived at definitions which tend to be 
simplistic, failing to take account of historical forms, and hence leaving 
to one side, or perceiving as inessential certain persistent trends. 
Because of the close conjunction between the public sphere and privacy, 
theories formulated in such a way cause the definition of the former to 
radiate into that of the latter. This explains why the increasing 
importance attached to the protection of privacy has been deduced 
partly from the development of modern mass communication and partly 
from the problems of protection of data. This method has produced a 
drastic curtailment of the history of privacy and an oversimplification of 
its function. Due to multidisciplinary approaches, the situation has 
changed considerably, so that we now find some analyses that have 
moved on from that position, incorporating privacy into some sort of 
explicit or implicit theory of society and recognizing significant anthro­
pological and ethological antecedents.4 We also wish to expound our 
own interdisciplinary definition by outlining the crucial turning-points in 
history, the history of jurisprudence and the history of science.
From the juridico-historical standpoint, possibly the single most 
important antecedent is the period in the development of Roman law 
in which, firstly, Roman magistrates were required to publicly promul­
gate their interpretations of the statutes and, secondly, a system of 
public criminal proceedings was introduced.5 These developments made 
the legal system predictable for the free citizen. The establishment of
3 One of the most interesting works of this trend is Barrington Moore’s Privacy. 
Studies in Social and Cultural History, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 1984.
4 For instance Alan Westin, “The origins of modern claims to privacy”, in: 
Philosophical Dimensions o f Privacy: An Anthology, edited by F. D. Schoeman, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984, p. 70.





























































































the public sphere of the administration of justice was a major step on 
the long road towards equality before the law, inasmuch as the 
personalized character of the administration of justice was thereby 
restricted. The publicly promulgated interpretation of statutes applied 
to a generalized abstraction of the citizen. In a given law-suit, that 
which fell outside the force and competence of the interpretation of the 
statutes could belong to the private sphere of the individual. Formerly, 
under the sacral practice of the administration of justice, which only 
recognized individual cases, the individual resorting to legal remedy had 
had his entire personality judged and scrutinized. The move towards the 
establishment of the public sphere of application of the law also brought 
with it the appearance of elements of the private sphere.
The latitude of action of the individual ensured by a legal framework 
was further expanded when, to assist him in a matter under dispute, he 
could hire one or more representatives (advocates) versed in jurispru­
dence.6 To some extent, this already separated his law-suit from his 
own external physical appearance and personality, enabling him to draw 
up a preliminary strategy and to conceal his particular attitude towards 
his earlier action or intention, which through his law-suit is made public 
— that is to say, in a wider philosophical sense, he defines his attitude 
towards his own former self. It was this type of private sphere — 
guaranteed only indirectly under the law — that attended the public 
access created and regulated by Roman law.
The Renaissance encompassed not only the propagation of the values 
of classical Greco-Roman civilization but also a widening of the 
application of Roman law — especially in Italy and in the Western 
European countries affected by the Renaissance. “From the eleventh 
century to the eighteenth and even beyond, the main feature of legal 
change in Western Continental Europe was the reception of Roman 
Law. At the beginning of that period law was above all custom, and 
throughout the period the main development in private law lay in the 
interaction between custom and Roman law.”7 — writes Alan Watson 
in his work The Evolution o f Law. This system of jurisprudence was 
more predictable and its level of abstraction exceeded that of the other
6 Kunkel, op. cit. “Die FairneB, mit der die romischen ProzeBgesetze insbesondere 
dem Angeklagten Raum fiir seine Verteidigung gewâhrte, ist iiberaus eindrucksvoll, 
für unsere Begriffe sogar übertrieben. Er konnte zeitweise bis zu sechs Anwâlte für 
sich auftreten lassen.” p. 67.
7 Alan Watson, The Evolution o f Law, Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins 




























































































European legal systems. That reception gave a major boost to the 
development of the private sphere.
The aspirations of cities for self-government and — after the age of 
the wars of religion — the greater religious and ideological tolerance 
created by the Peace of Westphalia (1648) led to the appearance of an 
internal public sphere in the big cities. The expansion of the private 
sphere is indicated by the considerably increased demand for reading 
and entertainment. These forms of activity also helped to create the 
self-cultivation of personality.
The individual’s latitude of action engendered by a better-defined 
interpretation of the law was complemented, in the religious field, by a 
different kind of freedom of interpretation. This was produced by the 
religious reforms initiated by Luther and Calvin, one of whose conse­
quences was the free interpretation of the Bible. Luther sharply rejected 
the suggestion that interpretation sanctioned by the church hierarchy 
could be of exclusive and obligatory validity.8 The Bible was translated 
into the vernacular, ending the Church’s monopoly over the interpreta­
tion of the Latin text. The rejection of confession,9 *required by the 
Catholic Church, likewise represented an unequivocal strengthening of 
the private sphere.
The next important stage in the evolution of law was a result of the 
French Revolution and particularly the subsumption of the new law 
system, the Code Civil, which, by the consistent enforcement of the 
principles of freedom and equality before the law, reinforced further the 
protection of the private sphere. This new legal development coincided 
with the legal guaranteeing of openness — primarily through the 
establishment of press freedom, which, in the 19th century, gradually 
gained ground in Western Europe.
The widening of the public sphere and the strengthening of public 
opinion in the second half of the last century prompted some liberal 
thinkers to turn their attention to the protection of the private sphere. In 
his work Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the British lawyer and 
philosopher James Fitzjames Stephen writes: “Legislation and public 
opinion ought in all cases whatever scrupulously to respect privacy. To 
define the province of privacy distinctly is impossible, but it can be 
described in general terms. All the more intimate and delicate relations
8 “Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae”, in: D. Martin Luthers Werke, B.8. Weimar 1888, 
p. 508.
9 Barrington Moore, op. cit. “... the practice of oral confession aroused widespread




























































































of life are of such a nature that to submit them to unsympathetic 
observation, or to observation which is sympathetic in the wrong way, 
inflicts great pain, and may inflict lasting moral injury.”10 Stephen also 
draws attention to a less analysed aspect: “Privacy may be violated not 
only by the intrusion of a stranger, but by compelling or persuading a 
person to direct too much attention to his own feelings and to attach 
too much importance to their analysis.”11 Here he posits, in fact, a 
kind of duality within the personality, the relationship between whose 
poles has been disturbed by external pressure acting on the private 
sphere.
Stephen also points to the crucial correspondence whereby creativity 
depends on the presence of the private sphere.12 Stephen’s ideas have 
been further developed, though in the U.S. from the end of the 19th 
century onwards, it was the legal interpretations that came to the fore.
Juridico-historical surveys written by American authors frequently 
began by citations, from American legal practice, of the first court 
decisions in violation of privacy cases. The question of legal compensa­
tion for unwarranted intrusion into the private sphere was first raised 
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, in their — since then, 
much quoted13 — article “The Right to Privacy”14, in connection with 
a case in which a newspaper published what was considered to be 
private information about a particular person. Legal practice, which 
supported citizens seeking to protect themselves against the excesses of 
newspaper prying, provided, in ever greater respects, fulcrums for the 
protection of privacy. The primary reason for the publication of a 
plethora of information on private life was the fierce competition
10 James F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, New York: Henry Hold and 
Co. 1873, p. 160. Quoted by F. D. Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions o f Privacy,
pp. 10-11.
11 Ibid. p. 11.
12 Id. p. 12.
13 This article “is perhaps the most famous and certainly the most influential law 
review article ever written.” Nimmer, “The Right of Publicity”, Law and Contemp. 
Probs. 1954, 19, p. 203. Quoted by Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of 
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort”, California Law Review 
1989, 77, p. 958.
14 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, Harvard Law Review 1890, 4, 





























































































provoked by the free market, which created a demand for all types of 
information, for the acquisition of patterns of the successful conduct of 
life. Newspaper prying, in turn, tried to cater to that demand.
According to an analysis published by Robert C. Post in the 1989 
volume of the Californian Law Review, U.S. law — as a result of the 
development that has occurred in the past hundred years — distin­
guished four areas in the violation of the private sphere: “unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another; unreasonable publicity given to 
another’s private life; appropriation of another’s name or likeness and 
publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the 
public.”15 All this confirms what Parent, criticizing the definitions of 
privacy, mentions as a fundamental factor — namely, that it is the 
manner of handling information about the individual which is most 
important.16 Other authors also confirm this essential feature of privacy 
— that control over the handling of information relating to the 
individual is of crucial importance to the existence and maintenance of 
the private sphere.17
In defining the social background behind the legal terms, Robert C. 
Post relies on Erwing Goffman’s theory of social psychology. He 
explains that U.S. law “...regards the privacy tort as simultaneously 
upholding social norms and redressing ‘injury to personality’.”18 For 
“social norms”, Post substitutes a term closer to the law “civility rules” 
which confirm the “social personality” of the individual, i.e. his/her 
condition as a citizen in a general sense. In the case of the invasion of 
privacy, the individual seeks redress at law partly because he or she has 
been treated disrespectfully: “The victim of the breach of a civility rule, 
in other words, suffers a special kind of injury: He is ‘threatened’ with 
being ‘discredited’ because he has been excluded from the ‘chain of cer­
emony’ which establishes the respect normally accorded to fully-fledged 
members of the community. Since the boundaries of a community are 
marked by the ‘special claims which members have on each other, as 
distinct from others’, the defendant’s disregard of the plaintiff’s claim 
to be treated with respect potentially places the plaintiff outside of the
15 Post, op. cit. p. 958.
16 W. A. Parent, “III. Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy”, American 
Philosophical Quarterly 1983, 20, p. 343.
17 Charles Fried, “Privacy (A Moral Analysis)”, in: Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy.




























































































bounds of the shared community.”19 On the other hand, the law gives 
redress to the individual for his/her own personal grievance. That 
duality arises from the distinction drawn between the public individual 
(citoyen) and the private individual (bourgeois), a distinction valid for the 
citizens of all societies possessing a public sphere.
This external duality between the private individual and the public 
individual, known to political science since Locke, also leaves its imprint 
in the structure of the individual, of the self. The beginnings of the 
internal duality of the individual have already been pointed out in our 
analysis of Roman jurisdiction. In Stephen’s philosophy we encounter 
one of the first theoretical conceptualizations of that duality. Georg 
Simmel was the first sociologist to try and find a theoretical explanation 
for this phenomenon. The behavioural elements designated by the 
categories of “self-revelation” and “self-restraint” — his own formula­
tions — are considered by him to be constant components of social 
intercourse.20
The duality of the self of the individual, as a fundamental internal 
structural peculiarity, was first described by George Herbert Mead in his 
theory of social psychology. Within the self, he distinguishes between 
the “I” and the “me”: “The ‘I’ reacts to the self which arises through 
the taking of the attitudes of others. Through taking those attitudes we 
have introduced the ‘me’ and we react to it as an ‘I’.”21 “The T  is in 
a certain sense that with which we do identify ourselves.”22 The “I”, 
then, is really something internal, something more difficult to bring into 
focus. It is this component that constitutes the core of the singularity of 
the individual. As to the definition of the “me”: “Now, in so far as the 
individual arouses in himself the attitudes of the others, there arises an 
organized group of responses. And it is due to the individual’s ability to 
take the attitudes of these others in so far as they can be organized that 
he gets self-consciousness. The taking of all of those organized sets of 
attitudes gives him his ‘me’; that is the self he is aware of.”23 The “me” 
is of an instrumental character in its relationship to the “I”, which tries
19 Post, op. cit. p. 968.
20 Simmel’s theory and categories are cited by Robert F. Murphy, “Social Distance 
and the Veil”, in: Philosophical Dimensions o f Privacy, pp. 34-35.
21 George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social 
Behaviourist, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1974, p. 174.
22 Ibid. pp. 174-175.




























































































to perform the duties of the self: “ [The T] fulfils his duty...The ‘me’ 
arises to do that duty — that is the way in which it arises in his 
experience.”24 The evolution of the “I” and the “me”, as has been 
already pointed out, goes right back to antiquity. By the public 
interpretation of the law, Roman law presupposes a general abstraction 
of the citizen, while the various forms of public sphere presuppose a 
general abstraction of the participant. In European history, the response 
of the individual to that situation has been increasingly to evolve roles, 
which he could push in front of him partly for defence and partly as a 
means by which to press forward. The “me” is the internal coordinator 
of role-stereotypes; through the mediation of the “me”, the individual 
elaborates specific “technologies” of self-preservation.
The differentiation formulated by Mead in communication theory is 
widely used outside social psychology as well. In social psychology, his 
theory was further developed by Erwing Goffman, among others. The 
whole theory of duality then became one of the corner-stones of 
theories on privacy, so that it is often applied to privacy without any 
reference being made to the first proponents of the theory. Arnold 
Simmel identifies the boundaries of privacy with those of the self, which, 
for its part, is made up of two components, one of them being the 
“charismatic self — what we perceive in ourselves as different, 
freedom-demanding, ausser-alltaeglich, unquestionable, and worthy of 
complete loyalty”25; whilst the other component is the accommodating 
self, turned towards the outer world. Michael A. Weinstein articulates 
this duality as follows: “In the end, bourgeois society leaves people with 
two selves: a private self with interests that cannot be pursued in public 
and a social mask for the conduct of human relations.”26 *But the two 
components of the self, as is apparent from the historical overview, are 
not peculiar to capitalist society.
The connection between the two components o f the self is the most 
important area o f the private sphere. Information relating to it is of the 
most confidential character. As Stephen pointed out, any interference 
in the normal relationship between the two is, in itself, a violation of the 
private sphere. Information relating to the individual — which some­
24 Ibid. pp. 175-176.
25 Arnold Simmel, “Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom”, in: Privacy. Nomos XIII, 
p. 73. Here the other component may, amongst other things, be deduced from the 
proposition that the charismatic self is what “we perceive in ourselves”.





























































































times applies to quite extrinsic things — assumes importance from the 
viewpoint of the protection of privacy by virtue of the fact that it 
inferentially reveals — against the will of the individual — something 
about that singular interrelationship. Information accumulated on things 
falling within the private sphere of the individual not only renders the 
individual vulnerable but, in the last analysis, and here we accentuate 
a philosophical aspect — it may deprive him of his character as a 
goal-setting subject, degrading him into a mere tool which serves the 
interests of the individual or individuals usurping and utilizing the 
information. The significant restriction or violation of privacy — 
according to this definition — may entail the restriction, distortion or 
transformation of one’s identity.
It is through the analysis of privacy from the perspective of identity 
that we arrive at the negative features of this social phenomenon. 
Undue extension of the boundaries of privacy may lead to egoism and 
the oppression of others; while the inordinate reinforcement of the 
existing boundaries or an inflexible recognition of them will result in a 
lack of solidarity.
The concept o f the privacy of the group
Both by proceeding from theoretical generalizations and by relying on 
the historical study of groups, we may now arrive at a definition of the 
private sphere of the group in terms of social psychology and sociology. 
Relying on Marcel Mauss’ and Georges Gurwitch’s research into the 
sociology of the group and their theoretical work, René Kônig 
emphasizes that “Even groups, however small they may be, are total 
social phenomena possessing their unique dimensions of depth.”27 This 
explains why groups can possess a singular awareness of identity 
(“Wir-Bewuatsein’’j.28 From total social character and awareness of 
identity it follows that a group also possesses a private sphere, which it 
strives to protect in order to maintain its identity and viability.
According to the theory of George Herbert Mead, within macro- and 
microgroups — religious communities, nations, and work groups —
27 René Kônig, “Die analytisch-praktische Doppelbedeutung des Gruppentheorems. 
Ein Blick in die Hintergriinde”, in: Gruppensoziologie. Perspektiven and Materialien, 
Hrsg. von Friedhelm Niedhart, Opladen: Westdeutscher V. 1983, p. 59.




























































































there may occur, in attitudes, a coalescence of the “I” and the “me”.29 
According to the above definition of privacy, this represents — on the 
plane determined by attitudes — a reduction of the private sphere. 
Given that, in all epochs of history, individuals were socialized in groups 
and the majority of them belonged to some macro- or microgroup or 
more groups; being restricted at some level has been the normal 
condition of personal privacy.
Friedrich H. Tenbruck and Wilhelm A. Ruopp — in their article 
which scans the changing patterns and development of groups in a 
historical dimension — state that “The relevant social changes of the 
19th century had already been in place, in a preliminary form, in the 
18th-century movement for association which had developed from the 
demands for a rationally based society — demands provoked by 
religious development and established by the Enlightenment.”30 The 
authors assume that this process takes place in the same way in our 
time, too. If these groups did not exist and, we might add, in the 
absence of the public domain that could serve as the framework for 
their regulated rivalry, modernization can, for the most part, be initiated 
only from above, with rather variable results/1 The rivalry between 
groups or associations which offer alternatives to society as a whole, is 
attended by conflicts and, in the long run, by the formulation of 
strategies designed to protect the private spheres of these groups. In 
regard to the preservation of privacy and the continuation of creativity, 
a certain parallel can be drawn between the significance of the private 
sphere of the individual and that of the group.
The right of combination and assembly, regarded as a fundamental 
right by the French Revolution, only provided the framework for the 
organization and competition of social groups. The demand of groups 
for privacy is brought to the forefront of daily consciousness partly 
under the pressure of a strong competitive situation and partly by 
excessive state control. The modem manifestation of the former is 
newspaper prying, which, in its drive to satisfy the general hunger for 
information, does not spare groups, either; while the most pronounced
29 G. H. Mead, op. cit. “I now wish to discuss in more detail than previously the 
fusion of the T  and the ‘me’ in the attitudes of religion, patriotism, and team work.” 
p. 273.
30 Friedrich H. Tenbruck - Wilhelm A. Ruopp, “Modernisierung - Vergesellschaf- 
tung - Gruppenbildung - Vereinswesen”, in: Gruppensoziologie. Perspektiven und 
Materialien, p. 72. 31




























































































manifestation of over-regulation by the State is the excessive collection 
of data about citizens and their groups.
In the case of the privacy of associations and, more generally, of all 
groups, the same legal dimensions can be postulated as those described 
by Post for American legal practice relating to individual privacy. In the 
United States, amidst strong ethnic and racial conflicts, it has become 
particularly important — in the interests of reducing and preventing 
prejudice — to legally ensure that particular social groups are not 
placed in a false light, and that their members or the groups in their 
entirety cannot be subjected to injury through distortions of the values 
they cherish. It is, moreover, an essential ingredient of the group’s right 
to privacy that those of its affairs which are subject to its own internal 
rules, rather than to the laws applying to all members of society, should 
be let to be deliberated behind closed doors, which may result even in 
the total exclusion of the general public. The protection o f the privacy of 
groups is thus also the self-defence o f society as a whole, in the sense 
expounded above, that it ensures, at both the micro- and the macrolevels, 
the possibility o f the development of alternatives necessary for shaping its 
future.
From the standpoint of privacy, the overwhelming majority of political 
parties may, in a certain respect, be regarded as exceptions because 
aspirations for power and the rules of the political game demand that 
the internal public sphere be laid bare to the general public. Neverthe­
less, certain personal or financial affairs may be treated and regarded 
as private. In their case, we may talk about limited privacy.
As was mentioned above, the competitive situation between groups, 
together with the development of the groups’ awareness of identity, 
brings with it an intellectualized awareness of the boundaries of the 
private sphere, as well as developing the instrumentalities for its 
protection. The same is true of macrogroups such as those represented 
by nations, ethnic groups, and societies. It is a significant historical 
example that the Napoleonic Wars aimed at self-defence and subse­
quently European unification under French domination were a 
prominent ingredient in the crystallization of a heightened awareness of 
national particularity: “There was a second consequence, albeit an 
unexpected one, of the assertion of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. 
When Frenchmen had to defend the gains of the revolution against the 
coalition of international rulers, they became highly conscious of their 
Frenchness. By repercussion, and to a point by imitation, in the revolt 
against Napoleonic conquest that also happened to be French, other 




























































































developed an intensified awareness of national difference.”32 — writes 
Albrecht-Carrie, in his work on European unity. That process was 
promoted by the operation of public and secret organizations formed 
earlier in which, as Tenbruck and Ruopp pointed out, “... the notions 
of free, secular coexistence were prefigured and mechanized.”33 This 
period of the formation of national consciousness brought with it a 
decisive change, too, in the mutual relations between nations. Conflicts 
proceeding from consciously recognized economic and political interests 
also had a reciprocal effect on the internal life of nations, as a result of 
which the developmental model outlined by Tenbruck and Ruopp was 
modified in a way which allowed — at moments when the nation was 
under increased threat — a particular group to acquire absolute control. 
In the history of the United States — not least because of the absence 
of such a major threat from outside — we find no examples of this type 
of scenario.
In the case of social groups, too, we do find the duality that pervades 
the private sphere of the individual. The group elaborates a strategy 
towards the public sphere, with the purpose of influencing the image 
and judgements formed of it by others. These peculiar strategies and the 
group’s defence against external pressures, as well as its internal 
self-building, may, be called the “technologies of the group”, to borrow 
Michel Foucault’s term.
In his work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), 
published in 1887, Ferdinand Tonnies distinguishes between the 
community that represents “genuine and organic life” and the kind of 
society that he evaluates as “an ideal and mechanical formation”. 
Tonnies did recognize the breakup of traditional communities and the 
rise of new communities based on association, which gained momentum 
in the latter half of the 19th century. The community, in his view, is 
united by ties of blood and a pattern of feeling anchored in common 
traditions. He defines society like this: “...we conceive of this aggregate, 
united by convention and natural law, as a mass of natural and artificial 
individuals whose volitions and territories have numerous contacts 
between them and are yet independent of each other, and remain
32 René Albrecht-Carrié, The Concert o f Europe. 1815-1914, New York: Evanston 
and London: Harper Torchbooks 1968, p. 3.




























































































without mutual internal effects.”34 This sharp contradistinction has 
been discredited by the findings of sociology and social psychology, 
because unconscious meshings and interactions, as well as instances of 
traditionformation, can be identified in the activity of all groups. 
Common traditions and the components which pertain to the self-defini­
tion of a group constitute the inner core of the private sphere; whereas 
the components of “society”, as defined by Tonnies, form the elements 
of an outer shell or carapace, acting as a buffer. The “invention of 
traditions” which also shaped the external image of the given nation 
corresponds to the activity of the “me”, of the collective self, of the 
national identity.
The presence, at the end of the last century, of the public sphere of 
nations and their attendant rivalry is shown by other trends as well. One 
of the most striking is the idealization of the national past, whereby a 
part of the national tradition is used to create an essentially fictitious 
national identity. During that process, the spiritual outlooks of the two 
types of groups within nations — came into interaction, as the new 
parties and associations built up a new “system of traditions” out of 
particular elements of the traditions generated by the earlier, natural 
community of the nation. They did so, for the most part, in the service, 
of a strongly nationalistic ideology, and, in the competition between the 
groups, this new system of traditions played to their advantage. 
Hobsbawm shows that the mass production of traditions falls in the 
1870-1914 period — the very point in history which saw the unfolding 
of competition between the nations.3S *At the time of the appearance 
of the need for the protection of national identity and the national 
private sphere — the time of the mass production of traditions — the 
social sciences, because of their lack of sophistication or adequate 
analysis, proved unequal to the task of countervailing this extremely 
irrationalistic trend in intellectual life.
In defining the private sphere of micro- and macrogroups, primarily 
using the results of contemporary sociology and social psychology, we 
arrived at positing the existence of group privacy and at the definition 
of the concept. In the process, while discussing the private sphere of the 
nation as a macrogroup, we indicated that, within the European matrix,
34 Ferdinand Tonnies, Kôzôsség és târsadalom (Community and Society), Budapest: 
Gondolât 1983, p. 73.
35 “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, in: The Invention o f Tradition,
edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Cambridge: Cambridge University




























































































the public sphere of macrogroups as well as that of societies within 
nations and multi-ethnic state-formations has been and still is operative. 
The existence of the latter we shall demonstrate by historical arguments, 
in what follows.
American privacy and immigration
It is a peculiarity of the development in the United States that, in the 
course of a more or less spontaneous legal codification, the concept of 
group privacy also appears. European development has been slower in 
this field, but certain of the conditions for ensuring the private sphere 
of the group were nevertheless gradually created within the compass of 
the European public sphere.
It is worth examining briefly some of the relevant aspects of U.S. 
history — relevant, that is to the topic in hand — which may help us 
illuminate the origin and the results of the strong demand for privacy 
there. At the same time, it would enable us to compare the structure of 
the public sphere in the U.S. with the structure of the European public 
sphere.
The striking differences between the Western European countries and 
the United States as regards the interpretation and legal implementation 
of privacy have often been analysed.36 When we try to explain the 
origin of the stronger American demand for privacy, we do not do so 
with the aim of making far-fetched comparisons between the United 
States of America and Europe.
It is a well-known fact that the overwhelming majority of the 
population of the United States are the descendants of immigrants. 
Some sources put the figure at 89 per cent, with the remaining 11 per 
cent made up of Indian aboriginal inhabitants and blacks forcibly 
resettled from Africa.37 The repeated waves of immigrants involved 
continuous assimilation, i.e. Americanization.38 *The position of the new
36 By the Nomos XIII and the Philosophical Dimensions o f Privacy most recently.
37 Maldwyn A. Jones, “Immigration to the United States: A General Overview”, in: 
American Immigration. Its Variety and Lasting Imprint, Editor Rob Kroes, 
Amsterdam: Amerika Instituut 1979, p. 3.
38 According to Maldwyn A. Jones, the first, second, and third generations of the
immigrants affected by the process of Americanization, i.e. assimilation, never
exceeded 35 per cent in the major cities, resulting in the numerical superiority of the




























































































citizens undergoing assimilation was extremely difficult, as the necessity 
of earning a living and the pursuit of higher living standards required 
rapid adaptation by them. Amidst the pressures o f expectations declared 
both publicly and in a legal form, they had an emphatic need for the 
preservation of their private sphere, as the customs and traditions they had 
brought with them could no longer be publicly experienced. All that bound 
them to their old national life had been condensed into the private sphere 
of either the individual and family group or the national I ethnic group?9 
As a result, the private spheres expanded, since — given that complete 
or partial assimilation took several generations to achieve — this 
demand for privacy persisted. Because of long-drawn-out assimilation40, 
expanded private spheres became embedded in the overall social 
development, becoming traditions and exerting a persistent influence in 
cultural, political, and everyday life. The U.S Constitution itself ensured 
a wide latitude to autonomous communities and self-administration, 
which the particular immigrant communities of various nationalities 
(which subsequently became minorities) duly used to their advantage.41
From the perspective of American privacy and the public sphere, it 
is most instructive to note that, even as late as the turn of the century, 
the leaders of immigrant national minorities were simultaneously 
advocating segregation and integration.42 The former represented the 
maintenance and protection of the private sphere of the minority group 
as a unit, and, by the same token, the maintenance and protection of
39 John Bodnar, Roger Simon and Michael P. Weber, Lives of Their Own. Blacks, 
Italians and Poles in Pittsburgh, 1900-1960, Chicago, London: University of Illinois 
Press 1982. The authors reveal that, for all the strong urbanizational effects, the old 
cultural-civilizational element brought from the mother country persisted, making 
its influence felt in occupational choices and in the choice of life conduct strategies, 
as well as in child-rearing, pp. 264-265. The authors quote, moreover, numerous 
researchers who have revealed the lasting imprint of the occupational and life- 
conduct culture brought over from the mother country, p. 5. “We compare the 
experience of two generations of Poles, blacks, and Italians living in the city of 
Pittsburgh between 1900 and 1960 and suggest that the family and premigration 
attitudes played a major role in the migration patterns, occupational choices, and 
housing accommodations of both first- and second-generation Poles and Italians.” 
pp. 6-7.
40 Ibid, “...sociologists such as Herbert Gans, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan 
demolished the notion of easy and rapid assimilation of immigrants.” p. 3.
41 Victor R. Greene, American Immigrant Leaders 1800-1910. Marginality and 
Identity, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press 1987, p. 142.




























































































the private sphere of the individuals. The latter — the invitation to 
integration — was prompted by the desire to help immigrants fulfil the 
requirements publicly laid down by the authorities and the 
Americanized population. These leaders recognized that the condition 
for successful adjustment was the maintenance of some measure of 
separation, within the cocoon of which the necessary measure of 
assimilation could take place. Here there developed an interaction 
between the strategies of assimilation, of public adjustment, on the one 
hand, and on the other the preservation, within the private sphere of 
individuals and groups, of the culture, idiom, and customs brought from 
the mother country — an interaction whose impact was to declare itself 
in later development. This is confirmed, for instance, by the 
social-psychological theory of the genesis of the private sphere which 
was formulated by Erik Erikson, the renowned American psychiatrist. 
According to his theory, the private sphere of a child growing up in an 
open family is larger than that of children with a closed family 
background. The open family “...is easily accessible to the surrounding 
community.”43 It is, moreover, characterized by the fact that “... the 
open family is likely only in situations where there is a high degree of 
homogeneity in the population, where parents do not worry about their 
children being exposed to influences much at variance with their own 
values, where, in fact, the activities people engage in are rather similar 
from family to family.”44 Families possessing ethnic ties, in which often 
even the choice of occupation is determined by the ethnic 
background,45 will, therefore, more likely come under the rubric of 
open families. It is not uncommon for these to be linked together by 
some minority organization, which holds joint events and takes a share 
in bringing up the children. The private sphere of these children, who 
grow up in a narrower community (family) and in a wider community 
(ethnic community) is, accordingly, larger than the private sphere of
43 Erik Erikson’s theory is quoted and applied by Arnold Simmel in his article 
“Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom”, in: Privacy. Nomos XIII, New York: Atherton 
Press 1971, p. 76.
44 Ibid. p. 76.
45 Lives on Their Own. In the case of Italians, Poles, and blacks, the authors identify 





























































































children growing up in closed families.46 This enlarged private sphere 
— formed also by the aforementioned educational circumstances — 
predestines one for the kind of self-definition that is perfectly capable 
of accommodating a wholehearted acceptance of being part of the 
ethnic community, the preservation of the language and part of their 
customs as well.
As we move into the early Sixties, we see a steady decline in the 
influence of particular ethnic organizations in the United States. Their 
organizations faded away or struggled to survive, and there was a sharp 
drop, too, in the sales of newspapers written in the language of the 
mother country. But this was also the period, that saw the burgeoning 
of the Black Civil Rights Movement and a concomitant discovery of the 
minority past, with the aim of building some kind of historical 
consciousness. Indeed, a term has been coined, in the monographic 
literature, to describe this sociological syndrome: in a reference to Alex 
Healey’s famous novel, it has been called the “roots”-phenomenon. 
Inspired by this movement, numerous native-born Americans embarked 
on a quest for their ancestors and their original culture47 48, thereby 
expressing their identity to the full. The movements of minorities 
acquired fresh vigour, finding scope for their activity thanks to 
American legal and social traditions. They were protecting not only 
their interests but also their private sphere, and in this they also found 
a legal background. The opportunity was handed to them, as it 
happened, by the development in legislation ensuring individual privacy. 
Newspaper prying, reacting to the changes, extended to the internal 
affairs of these groups, too. This seems to be behind the fact that the 
Sixties and the period following them saw the appearance o f the first works
• 48on group privacy.
Privacy — which had been steadily developing until the Sixties — and 
its legal protection thus led to a new branch of law and, through the 
sociology of law, to a new trend of sociology and other social sciences 
as well.
To sum up, we may state that the peculiarities of the American 
development primarily draw attention to the fact that there is a
46 According to Erikson’s theory, children from closed families are characterized by 
a smaller private sphere, but by greater sensitivity.
47 Lives of Their Own, p. 140.





























































































close-knit reciprocity between immigration and assimilation processes, 
on the one hand, and the emergence of a strong private sphere, on the 
other. The old culture and customs of the immigrants are preserved in 
the expanded private sphere. A strong private sphere, combined with a 
legal tradition supporting the self-government of communities, promotes 
the aspirations of particular groups for segregation and the enforcement 
of the demand of these groups for a private sphere. The strong 
competitive situation has created a need for prying not only in the case 
of individuals — where it is catered for by the mass media — but also 
in the case of groups.
The size of ethnic and other macrogroups, in the American situation, 
can even reach the proportions of a small European nation. Within the 
European matrix, because of differences in scale, relations between 
population groups of a similar size already fall within the sphere of 
diplomacy and international law. There, development towards the 
recognition of the privacy of larger social groups occurred differently.
From the national private sphere to the private sphere o f groups — The 
major landmarks in the development of the European public sphere
This very brief outline of the development of the European public 
sphere again requires that we sketch in the juridico-historical 
background, given that both the formation of the European public 
sphere and thinking about European unity have primarily tended to 
assume the character of juristic expositions.
Firstly, we must return to Roman law, which, after similar antecedents 
from antiquity,49 *created the institution of the ius gentium. The idea 
was such that, when the case of a non-Roman citizen was being heard, 
rather than administering justice within the compass of statutory Roman 
law, the provisions of another legal system — the one whose jurisdiction 
extended to the alien resorting to legal remedy — were also taken into 
account. The reception of Roman law, which took place in the Middle 
Ages and in modern times, also covered the ius gentium, but the “law
49 Wolfgang Kunkel, op. cit. “Der Fremde, dem nicht aufgrund zwischenstaatlicher
Vertrage eine mehr Oder weniger umfassende Gleichstellung mit dem Burger
zugestanden war, muBte sich bei rechtlichen Konflikten urspriinglich der Hilfe eines 




























































































of nations”, deduced from it, was different from it.50 One of the 
striking results of that reception of Roman law was the work of Grotius 
On the Law o f War and Peace, in which he defined the right to 
self-preservation as a fundamental principle.
Typical products of philosophical thinking paving the way to 
international law were schemes for eternal peace. The line of thinkers 
preoccupied with lasting peace begins with Erasmus. William Penn, 
writing at the end of the 17th century, already raised the idea not only 
of a European Parliament but also of an article to be included in his 
proposed system of treaties (providing for the verification, based on 
reciprocity, of military strength). This article would allow specified 
aspects of the life of particular states or societies to be challenged. In 
Penn, the strength of the army ceases to be a purely internal affair 
because it is precisely the reduction of armed forces that is the basis of 
the multilateral treaty.51 With this definition, he indirectly ruled out 
other aspects from the range of topics that could have been discussed. 
Immanuel Kant, in his work On Eternal Peace, moves a step further 
both in the formulation of the public sphere of nations and in a 
conceptualization of the national private sphere. He articulates the 
thesis of “non-intervention in internal affairs” in a separate point, with 
general validity: “No single state must aggressively interfere with the 
constitution and governance of another state.”52 This notion was soon 
incorporated into political thought in the wider sense that the activity 
of the participants in a system of treaties may be criticized or forced to 
alter their behaviour only in the areas covered by the treaty.
The true watershed events in the emergence of a pan-European 
public sphere were the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent signing of 
the multilateral political treaties in Vienna. The treaty system of the 
Holy Alliance, formed in 1815 to provide a counterweight to France, is 
regarded as a turning point both by historians of diplomacy and by 
researchers of the history of European political union. Thereafter, the 
web of relations between European countries has almost always been 
regulated by some sort of multilateral covenant.
50 Ibid. “Der Begriff des ius gentium hat also eine andere, umfassendere Bedeutung 
als der daraus abgeleitete modeme Begriff des ‘Volkerrecht’.” p. 74.
51 Kurt von Raumer, Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedensplane seit der 
Renaissance, Freiburg und Miinchen: V. Karl Alber 1953. Penn’s line of reasoning 
is based on a mutual regulation of armed forces. In this respect, the joint Parliament 
(Staatenhaus) would have some control, p. 333.




























































































Multilateral treaties, especially if they have a long life, are subjected 
to prolonged and manifold analysis, primarily by diplomats and lawyers. 
Interpretations are allowed to clash, not only within the individual 
countries but also at international meetings. These treaties are, in the 
end, surrounded by a grid of interpretations, which links the interpreters 
themselves within a field of communications. Interpretations are 
published in the press, causing wider public opinion to join in the 
process. Via communication-inducing processes, multilateral treaties thus 
have a public-sphere-forming effect.
Particularly from the second half of the 19th century onwards, 
political treaties were soon followed by agreements establishing 
international scientific, artistic, and other organizations. Taken 
separately, these agreements were of far smaller significance, but, due 
to their number, their impact — as regards the emergence of a 
pan-European public sphere — far out-weighed the influence of the 
larger agreements. The existence of a European academic and artistic 
public sphere was a powerful factor in the development and 
differentiation of a regulated political public sphere. A similar influence 
was exerted, too, by the international organizations of various labour 
movements.
In the evolution of the European multilateral treaty system into the 
political public sphere, an important stage is marked by the historical 
changes that — because of the divergent political interests — ended the 
leading great powers’ united monopoly on power. An elementary 
condition of the functioning of the public sphere is that it should be 
multipolar, because a single, exclusive centre of power otherwise 
transforms the entire public domain into its own domain of interest. 
These changes can be traced back to the Berlin Conference of 1878, 
and are expressed forcefully in the political settlements following the 
two World Wars — settlements which, however, failed to produce a 
complete breakthrough in the question of national self-determination.
In the last third of the 19th century, the practice of “inventing 
traditions” flourished and was accompanied by experiments to assimilate 
minorities into the leading nation. At this time several minority leaders 
were concerned with the establishment of an independent national 
state. The peace agreement concluding the First World War put an end 
to some multinational empires (Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary) and 
contained clauses regulating the treatment of minorities.
One of the effects of the manifold international treaty arrangements 
was the ever wider application of a diplomatic concept — that of 
“non-interference in internal affairs”, first introduced by Kant in his 




























































































social development, multilateral treaties came to cover more and more 
aspects of life, linking the nations of Europe on ever more levels. The 
demand for a private sphere, as well as self-determination, appears 
however, when there is a conscious recognition of a competitive 
situation taking place within the clearly defined constraints of the public 
sphere. The demand also arises when curiosity or prying, in the general 
sense of the word — in all its scientific, artistic, and journalistic forms 
— appears in a manifold manner, as a demand for access to additional 
information.
The separation of church and state has made religion a private affair. 
That regulation has also created a more appropriate legal status for 
smaller churches and denominations. Legal guarantees as to freedom of 
religion, and particularly those enabling smaller groups to worship 
without reference, represented a recognition, in this sense, of the 
private sphere of the given group.
A new and important stage in the development of a European and 
international public sphere was marked by the recognition, in 
international treaties, of the rights of various minorities — itself the 
result, in no small measure, of a conscious recognition of the events that 
had led up to World War II. At this point, European development 
entered a phase similar to that which American legal development had 
entered, by ensuring the privacy of the group. For the societies of the 
states integrating into a progressively diversified European public 
sphere, for the individual nations and minorities, it is not a matter of 
indifference as to what opinion is formed about them by the audience 
of that public sphere. Even today we can hear and read about 
complaints — voiced in diplomatic and other forms — that concern 
cases where certain nations, groups or persons have been placed in a 
false light or where supposedly unjustifiable disapproval has been 
expressed over something that has happened within a country.
One of the most characteristic manifestations of the functioning of 
the European public sphere was the success of the voluntary movements 
working for European Union after World War II. These movements 
were mostly organized by intellectuals from various countries. The 
public sphere of individuals in this case exerted a regulating effect on 
the public sphere of nations.
These movements also influenced diplomacy by limiting its secrecy. 
The creation of European Union takes place behind closed doors to a 
lesser extent than other diplomatic actions.
The movements for Union fostered the support of equality and 
self-determination of nations, ending with the acceptance of UN 




























































































colonial countries. It was followed by the convention of 1966 which 
declared the equality of all nations and ethnic groups.
Decolonisation, European integration and the consolidation of the 
European public sphere meant a growing freedom for minorities. The 
strength of minority movements has been remarked upon by several 
scientists and journalists in the past twenty years. Pierre Kende wrote: 
“One had expected the development of a new European consciousness 
but one actually experienced the growth of an ethnic-regional 
particularism which refutes the idea of the nation — in the name not 
of a larger unity but that of a much smaller.”53 Two basic tendencies 
can be observed of these macrogroups: a fundamentalist one, which is 
attached to tradition and a “fundamental” continuity of national 
identity, and a liberal one, which interprets national or ethnic identity 
and conflicts with others more flexibly.54 The sensibility of these 
macrogroups is, however, more the consequence of the vulnerability of 
their private sphere and identity than an ambitious and aggressive 
nationalism.
Conclusions
In the course of a process that can be traced back to classical antiquity, 
the rudimentary, fragmented forms of the public sphere and privacy 
gradually gave place to more complex configurations. In the course of 
the emergence of individual privacy, the structure of the self, of the 
individual, divided into two basic components. The undisrupted 
interaction of these two components is an important condition for the 
building of the personality and, in general, for the preservation of 
creative power. The vital core of the private sphere is the operational
53 Pierre Kende, “La France et l’intégration européenne”, in: Commentaire, Paris 
1979, 6, cited by Werner Weinfeld in: Die Identitat Europas, Bonn: Bundeszentrale 
fiir politische Bildung 1985, p. 73.
54 James Mayall sees two political tendencies interpreting national self- 
determination: “The most that can be said for the conventional (i.e. anticolonial) 
interpretation of national self-determination is that it is a sensible compromise. 
Given the indeterminacy of the idea of the collective self on the one hand, and the 
impossibility within the contemporary stock of political ideas of arriving at an 
alternative justification of political authority on the other, it represents some kind 
of deal, albeit a somewhat shabby one, between the entrenched forces of liberal 
rationalism and those of historical essentialism.” Nationalism and International 




























































































space generated by the dissociation between the two components; it is 
here that their interaction takes place. In the course of a historical 
process, it became a recognized right of the individual to control all the 
information relating to this sphere.
The recognition of the private sphere of groups followed by a 
considerable delay the legal safeguarding of individual privacy. This 
delay is at least partly attributable to the various ambitions held by 
social groups — ambitions often directed at the acquisition of total 
control — and, moreover, to the absolute power of the state. From the 
behaviour of the historically actualized formations of groups, one may 
extrapolate a structure of privacy that is similar to the structure of the 
individual private sphere.
Both the American and the European development did ultimately 
lead, in one way or another, to the practical, statutory or indirect 
protection of the private sphere of major social units (micro- and 
macrogroups, religious denominations, associations, nations) — to some 
kind of legal or diplomatic or scientific definition or delimitation of their 
private sphere. As regards the legal recognition of group privacy, there 
is also a substantial difference — albeit one which cannot be absolutized 
— between the development seen in the United States and similar 
processes in Europe.
The traditionally strong demand for privacy in the United States may 
be traced back to difficulties in the long-drawn-out assimilation 
processes. The safeguarding of group privacy was arrived at primarily 
through the legal protection of individual privacy, which had again been 
directly necessitated by newspaper prying, satisfying the need for 
information. As a result of a successful assimilation process, the internal 
public sphere of the United States was ultimately dominated by the 
public sphere of individuals; although, in all the areas of social life, 
various minority groups — including the ethnic groups which had 
developed from immigrant groups — were also asserting their rights, 
including their right to privacy.
In Europe, we see a more complicated development. After centuries 
of anticipation — in the fields of jurisprudence, philosophy, and 
historiography — we see the gradual development of a public sphere 
that is the public sphere not only of individuals but also of societies of 
rival nations and/or states comprising several nations. This other level 
of the public sphere gradually became multi-centred, allowing the 
smaller nations to slowly emerge from the shadow of the major powers. 
Owing to the two-level structure of the European public sphere, the 
concept of group privacy was first expressed in formulations that had a 




























































































interfere in the constitution and governance of another state”. This 
maxim later became a standard political formulation under the more 
modem diplomatic phrase of “non-intervention in internal affairs”. The 
development of the public sphere of nations and state-formations 
encompassing nations is marked, on the side of privacy, by phases such 
as the appearance of national consciousness, the practice of “inventing 
traditions”, the diplomatic protection of national minorities and their 
protection based on international law, and the demand that their 
cultural identity be guaranteed. As a consequence of participation in the 
European public sphere of nations, two basic tendencies, a 
liberal-rationalist and a fundamentalist one, emerged in each nation, 
minority or ethnic group, interpreting very differently the national 


























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge -  depending on the availability of
stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy
From Name . , 
Address
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1992/93









































































































EPC and the Single Act:
From Soft Law to Hard Law?*
EPU No. 90/2
Richard N. MOTT 
Federal-State Relations in U.S.
Environmental




Product Safety Law, Internal Market Policy 
and the Proposal for a Directive 
on General Product Safety
EPU No. 90/4
Martin WESTLAKE 
The Origin and Development 
of the Question Time Procedure 
in the European Parliament *
EPU No. 90/5
Ana Isabel ESCALONA ORCAO 
La cooperacfon de la CEE al desarrollo de 




Do Public Policy and Regulation Still Matter 
for Environmental Protection in Agriculture?
EPU No. 91/7
Ortwin RENN/Rachel FINSON 
The Great Lakes Clean-up Program:
A Role Model for International 
Cooperation?
EPU No. 91/8
Une politique étrangère pour l’Europe.
Rapport du groupe de travail
sur la réforme de la coopération politique
EPU No. 91/9
Elena FLORES/Peter ZANGL 
La structure financière de la Communauté 
face aux défis présents et futurs
EPU No. 91/10





The Consultative Function of the Economic 
and Social Committee of the European 
Community
EPU No. 91/12
Ida J. KOPPEN/Maria Rosaria MAUGER 1/ 
Francesca PESTELLINI 








The Passage Trough the Community's 
Legislative System of Emergency Measures 
Related to German Unification
EPU NO. 92/15
Zhang YUNLING
European Economic Integration and East 
and South-East Asian Economy
EPU 92/16
Mihaly SZIVOS
From Individual Privacy to the Privacy of 
Groups and Nations - An Approach to the 
Problems of the Structure of the European 
Public Sphere
Working Paper out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
.
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
• 'fri* '
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
